taxonomy, DNA and Scilla

[Sinchets]

Yes, but clearly different us may not mean much to the plants in question- though it may mean an awful lot to their pollinators.

[gote]

We have been discussing this before.

I have noted from political discussions that the definition of the word "democratic" is "something the speaker likes" and the definition of "undemocratic" is "something that the speaker does not like" 

We run into this here. "Species is what the speaker calls it."  Now if we discuss whether something is a Scilla or not we are not discussing the species but the genus.
 
It is extremely impractical to start changing the name every time a new DNA-fragment is found somewhere. We are running in a situation where names become useless. I cannot go out in the garden and disregard morphological questions.

If one says: that the traditional morphological concept of species - based on gross morphology - is empirically untenable. This means that this person and those who think as he define the concept of species in a way that makes morphological concept of species empirically untenable. This, of course makes me wonder what is meant by empirical. Taxonomy is older than DNA-sequencing by a few hundred years.

When Jim says that Orchidaceae is one big species is just tells us what HE means with the word species. It tells us nothing about the plants in question. 

A name is a name is a name. If I find a plant that confirms to say Anemone hepatica L. as described in the original diagnosis it is an Anemone hepatica L. even if the DNA says it is a magpie.
This is a traditional way of defining species and it serves us well. It does not tell us the latest news about ancestry but it puts stable labels on plants that are useful to us.

Göte

If it walks like a duck and sounds like a duck and looks like a duck it is a Citroën 2CV 




 

[Gerry Webster]

If one says: that the traditional morphological concept of species - based on gross morphology - is empirically untenable. This means that this person and those who think as he define the concept of species in a way that makes morphological concept of species empirically untenable. This, of course makes me wonder what is meant by empirical. Taxonomy is older than DNA-sequencing by a few hundred years.

Göte - The traditional - Linnaean -  morphological concept  of species conceives species as  (logical) classes. Classes are defined in terms of common or shared properties &, by definition,  classes cannot have unusual members. The variation which exists in organisms has always posed problems for this traditional view; one way of dealing with this has been to multiply classes, i.e.,  invent subspecies, varieties etc, a procedure which, in principle, could continue until there are as many classes as there are individual organisms. Another way is to accept that  the Linnaean concept is empirically untenable  & attempt to elaborate an alternative  based the so-called 'biological' concept of species derived from evolution theory. The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality. I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions.  There is a good deal of serious academic research on the topic  &, if you wish, I can send you references.

This whole question is quite distinct from taxonomic revisions based on DNA analysis, concerning which, & as yet, I am somewhat sceptical.
     

[gote]

The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality.
I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions.    

All members of a class do not need to be identical. However, we can define criteria that circumscribe a class. We can also define subclasses by defining criteria that that circumscribe these. That far I am with you but then we are of diverging opinions. I cannot see that you have shown that the Linnean system is untenable. You probably have underlying assumptions which you assume I accept a priori so you do not need to mention them. I probably do not accept them.

My view is that we humans define the criteria used in classification. These definitions cannot be described as true or false. They are what they are. Let me make an example that is somewhat obsolete but easy to discuss:

We can say that plants with six anthers belong to the class Hexandria L. (In fact someone did) I cannot see that this poses a problem in the classification.  Practically all angiosperms have a number of anthers and that number is six or it is something else. Your statement that it is a question of truth and reality does not apply. If plants having six stamens are classified as hexandria this IS the truth since this is the definition of Hexandria. It is also the reality since they DO have six anthers.

The problem comes if we say that classification at all cost must reflect the biological history. This is a criterion that is in conflict with the previous. This is where our problems lie. There are disadvantages with this criterion:

#1: Taken all the way, it makes previous taxonomy obsolete; meaning what we have learnt and what we have on our labels and in our books becomes significantly more uncertain.
#2: We do not know. Whatever the brave new researchers may say, we do not know. We guess based on various research results which are too esoteric for those who do not have a big laboratory at command and the guesses change all the time.
#3: It makes it utterly difficult to find the name of a found plant and to classify a new.
#4 Differentiation does not occur burstwise. The genealogical tree does not suddenly split into many branches. New branches bud off singly. Sometimes they also merge. Unless we accept monotypical classes all over, we will have to accept some kind of arbitrary (meaning manmade) borderlines that circumscribe classes be it genus, species, order or family.

It all boils down to what a name is used for. Is it a history record, like the names of the ents in 'The Ring' or is it a label that we use in order to get a handle on a phenomenon called a plant. To me it is a handle like the handles we use in computer programming or the number in a street address. Utilty is indeed important. It would seem to me that if we abandon utility as criterion we by definition create a useless system.

It is of interest to know that Highstreet No 11 is built 1998 and highstreet No 13 is built 1956 but for that reason we do not switch their numbers. We find it practical to number buildings in sequence as they stand not according to age. Once upon a time houses indeed were numbered after age. This is the reason why Eau de Cologne has 'Glockengasse 4711' in the name. Once upon a time (perhaps not in the UK) Maria, daughter of Karl Andersson would be named Maria Karlsdotter. Today we call her Maria Andersson although her father's name is not Anders and she is not his son.

I do not advocate that we should completely disregard what we believe about relationships when classifying. What I advocate is that we should stick to easily observed traits when we define the criteria that we use in classification and to use criteria that give a useful system. If we abandon the original diagnosis and the type specimen as basis for a name, nearly all names need to be redefined.

Göte

You are right. I have a technical background. That is precisely why I cannot see the problems in a mathematical approach to classification. 

[Gerry Webster]

The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality.
I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions.    

All members of a class do not need to be identical. However, we can define criteria that circumscribe a class. We can also define subclasses by defining criteria that that circumscribe these. That far I am with you but then we are of diverging opinions. I cannot see that you have shown that the Linnean system is untenable. You probably have underlying assumptions which you assume I accept a priori so you do not need to mention them. I probably do not accept them.

My view is that we humans define the criteria used in classification. These definitions cannot be described as true or false. They are what they are. Let me make an example that is somewhat obsolete but easy to discuss:

Göte

You are right. I have a technical background. That is precisely why I cannot see the problems in a mathematical approach to classification. 

All members of a class must be identical with respect to the properties in terms of which the class is defined, the so-called ‘essential’ properties. Other properties with respect  to which the members are not identical are irrelevant. This is where the problem of taxonomic ‘essentialism’  arises in relation to variation i.e., trying to determine what are the 'essential' properties which can be used to define a species.

I agree that definitions are neither true nor false. The question is whether anything in nature answers to the definition

I have already pointed out that there is a substantial body of relatively recent academic  work on this whole question of species concepts. May I suggest you read some of it - you might find it illuminating? The Linnaean, morphological concept of species has been called into question on both empirical & theoretical grounds by many evolutionary biologists of whom Ernst Mayr is probably the most notable (if not the most rigorous). However, the  untenability of the  Linnaean concept of species was  finally demonstrated not by me but by the American philosopher of biology David Hull  using the biologist's arguments combined with an analysis of the logical structure of the Linnaean system. Although you may find his conclusions inconvenient, his argument is compelling. 

I neither propose nor  support the view that classifications must reflect biological history (genealogy or phylogeny)  though they may do so incidentally. Even the Linnaean system is thought to do so by some evolutionary biologists; as the late Helen Spurway put it - to claim that two species belong to the same genus is to claim that they have a common ancestor.

Your position on science seems to have more than a touch of relativism about it in addition to the obvious utilitarianism. In matters pertaining to the philosophy of science I am a realist & consequently believe that science (even biology) is not concerned with utility but with the real structure of nature & with truth. If anything useful emerges, that is a bonus. The development of science frequently renders previous beliefs obsolete. If this detracts from their usefulness  & proves inconvenient, too bad.   

[gote]

Gerry,
A naming system is basically utilitarian. We use it as a tool. A name is shorthand for an enumeration of all the properties we think are relevant in order to circumscribe the "subject" of a name.
 
You question whether something answers to the definition is to me unclear. I do not understand.
 
If I define the class Hexandria as plants having six anthers I define it thus because I have observed plants having six anthers and I find the numbers of anthers a property that is easy to observe and useful for classification. You do not question my statement that there are plants having six anthers do you?

Since all diagnoses are verbal descriptions of the type specimen, there must have been something that answered to the definition; at least one and at least at the time. Your question is perhaps  whether the diagnosis fits other specimen. I think that it is very clear that it does. It has done that for a quarter millennium. Plants have been assigned names and it is being done innumerable times every hour. Every time we look up a plant in a book, catalogue or botanic garden we make utilitarian use of the classification. The name tells us a number of properties; many if we are knowledgable, few if we are not. It DOES work Gerry.

Human fallibility being what it is, many diagnoses have been imperfect and we have been forced to change. That is not an argument because this happens in all systems. .

I cannot help remembering the bumble bee. It cannot fly but it does not know so it flies anyway. If something works it is tenable. If someone claims that for philosophical reasons that it is not, that person is in error or the philosophy is in error. In my days in the Swedish army I read in the instructions. "If the terrain and the map disagree: The terrain is right". I think that this is an important principle.

"to claim that two species belong to the same genus is to claim that they have a common ancestor." This statement is incomplete and thereby nearly devoid of meaning. We believe ALL plants have a common ancestor.

"The development of science frequently renders previous beliefs obsolete." It all depends upon what we believe. If we believe in some kind of hidden  "Inner truth" that can be found lurking in the names it may be possible to falsify the name (or rather the lurking "truth") but if we do not do that but stick to the diagnosis it cannot be falsified. Should science some time in the future show that plants with six anthers never existed I will accept 'Hexandria' as meaningless but until then...... 

You write: "Your position on science seems to have more than a touch of relativism about it in addition to the obvious utilitarianism. In matters pertaining to the philosophy of science I am a realist & consequently believe that science (even biology) is not concerned with utility but with the real structure of nature & with truth."

I think that you do misread me. Let me start at the end: Science has to do with truth - tools have not. A naming system is a tool. A microscope can be good and it can be bad but it cannot be true or false. In principle only statements can be falsified. (Not all sentences that look like statements are statements). If I say: "This is Lilium concolor" I in reality say: "This is a plant that fulfils the criteria in the valid diagnosis of Lilium concolor". My statement can be falsified. If the plant has blue flowers the statement is untrue. The diagnosis of L concolor cannot be falsified. It is not a statement. It is a kind of creation. It can be badly constructed but it cannot be false.

No name is a part of "The real structure of nature". We cannot find the "True Name" of anything - even if we were to define a plant by a complete chart of its genome It would still be a human creation - guided by the finds but not created by them.

Tools need to be utilitarian otherwise it will be more difficult to find the truths. If we cannot name phenomena with a stable and understandable system we are nearly unable to find any truths whatsoever.

I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.

Göte 
     
 

[gote]

Postscript.
I cannot help finding this in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"most academic philosophers in the English-speaking world see the label ‘relativist’ as the kiss of death"
Please let me assure anyone who would be worried that like Mr Clemens I can claim:
"The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated"
Göte

[Gerry Webster]

I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.
Göte 

Göte -

I suggest the following:
Rom Harre, (1970). The Principles of Scientific Thinking, University of Chicago Press.

A good deal has been written about the 'species problem' since Linnaeus. The following provide useful introductions to the modern discussions  to which I referred:
D.L. Hull, (1965). The effect of essentialism on taxonomy - two thousand years of stasis. Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 15, 314-326; 16, 1-18.

D.L. Hull, (1976). A matter of individuality. Philosophy of Science 45, 335-360.

[Martin Baxendale]

I'm really enjoying this discussion (from the safety of the sidelines) and I don't mean that to be in any way sarcastic; it's a fascinating mind-workout trying to follow it. You're never going to agree of course, and it sometimes looks a bit like two very different discussions, not that that matters in the slightest.

From a purely practical viewpoint, I'm just glad we have a system that allows us to name plants in a (fairly) universally agreed way and thereby talk about them in a sensible way, on this forum and elsewhere. The search for better systems should be applauded but we have to work with what we have here and now, otherwise we'd all still be living in caves poo-pooing the design for the wheel while waiting for Ugg to come up with an anti-gravity engine.

Now you can both feel free to whack away at me and my ignorant impertinence instead of each other for a while. 

[Gerry Webster]

Martin - I'm glad the exchange provided enjoyment. I'm sorry that my last post on the matter was  my last post on the matter.

I agree that the Linnaean system in its present form works reasonably well a lot of the time, but one only has to look at the Sternbergia thread to see where it doesn't. And as for narcissus of the bulbocodium persuasion..........The debates between 'Splitters' & 'Lumpers' are the manifestations in the practical domain of the theoretical (or philosophical) problem - 'what is a species'?.

[Martin Baxendale]

one only has to look at the Sternbergia thread to see where it doesn't. And as for narcissus of the bulbocodium persuasion..........The debates between 'Splitters' & 'Lumpers' are the manifestations in the practical domain of the theoretical (or philosophical) problem - 'what is a species'?.

...and in crocus and some galanthus...

I do appreciate what a difficult - and fascinating - question that is ('what is a species?'). It seems easy to answer when looking at very widely divergent species, especially in the animal world, less so when looking at very close 'species' in the plant world. 

[Tony Willis]

I to have really enjoyed this thread from the sidelines. I am quite incapable of joining in but it has been stimulating and thought provoking.

I await the next one with great anticipation on what ever subject.

Thank you both.

[Tim Murphy]

I too have enjoyed the recent discussions very much. Being involved with the study of species hellebores for the last eight years, I can appreciate the frustrations of taxonomists. Fifteen trips to the Balkans over this time have raised more questions than answers.

Göte, I have found your views refreshing; I am no longer involved with hellebores (for various reasons, some related to do with having a seven month old little boy and therefore no spare time, and others directly related to taxonomy and what one German 'expert' wants to so with it all if he gets his own way; I no longer have the time or the energy to fight the cause), but many of your opinions almost ignite the fire within me again.

No offence to you, Gerry; I have enjoyed the discussion from both points of view.

[gote]

I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.
Göte 

Göte -

I suggest the following:
Rom Harre, (1970). The Principles of Scientific Thinking, University of Chicago Press.

A good deal has been written about the 'species problem' since Linnaeus. The following provide useful introductions to the modern discussions  to which I referred:
D.L. Hull, (1965). The effect of essentialism on taxonomy - two thousand years of stasis. Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 15, 314-326; 16, 1-18.

D.L. Hull, (1976). A matter of individuality. Philosophy of Science 45, 335-360.

Excuse me but I still want to know why you call me a relativist. I am quite sure that my name does not occur in these books. I am even more sure that you have not in these books written about me.
Come on! Defend your statement!
By the way: Does the Harre book say anything about argument "ad hominem" If so please read it again!
Göte

[gote]

Dear Gerry,
I regret the flippant tone of my last post. My excuse is that I am not more pleased to be called names than people usually are. Your placing me and the beliefs you believe I hold, against yourself where you call yourself a realist seeking the truth seems to put me on the side of the lie and the unrealistic. I pointed that out in a roundabout way in order to give you an opportunity to reformulate yourself in a less offending way but you did not do that.
 
Vikipedia defines utalitarian as : “Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility” I am at a loss to how you can determine my attitude to moral questions from my attitude to naming of plants. Instead of saying that I am offended, I am asking you for an explanation. Your answer was that I should read books about philosophy. This is not very helpful since I am asking about your perception of me which is unlikely to be found in a book.

You also say that I am a relativist. This is in itself not pejorative since some kinds of relativism are inevitable. It is difficult to say that something is big unless we mean that it is big relatively to something. On the other hand you say that you are a realist and seeking the truth. I must thus conclude that you mean that I am a relativist as regards truths. That is no doubt a pejorative verdict. However I am not complaining about insults, I am merely asking you to clarify. Again I cannot find that clarification in any book.

I mirrored your own way of answering by asking you to read. That was wrong by me. My excuse is that I was somewhat irritated by being treated like a schoolboy. I should have said clearly what I mean and that was: “You are using ad hominem argumentation. My stance, relative to relativism and utilitarianism, have nothing to do with whether my views on the use of botanical names are right or wrong.“
Yours
Göte
PS let us hope that I am not invoking Godwin’s law.