Scottish Rock Garden Club Forum
Bulbs => Bulbs General => Topic started by: Jim McKenney on March 24, 2009, 10:27:12 PM
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I read this today in an atricle about splitting up the genus Scilla to make more sense of it.
Finally, what is left of Scilla includes species such as S. bifolia as well
as the now defunct genus Chionodoxa (which itself forms 2 unrelated groups).
It does make sense of the whole fertile intergeneric hybrid thing with Scilla and Chionodoxa. I'm not normally a splitter by the way.
See http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/pbs/2003-December/016258.html (http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/pbs/2003-December/016258.html)
Simon, some of us take it a step further and say that the ability of nominal species to "hybridize" is proof that the entities in question actually make up one morphologically variable species.
Traditional taxonomy was based on morphology. The traditional view was, more or less, if two things looked alike, they were members of the same species.
But that point of view got it backwards: if two organisms look alike, the likely explanation is that they share the same gene pool. In other words, they are not members of the same species because they look alike, it's rather that they look alike because they are members of the same species and share the same gene pool. (There can be other explanations, too.)
And of course, the members of some widely distributed species which form Rassenkreise or clines sometimes do not resemble the other members of their species from distant parts of the range of the species.
Natural "hybrids" are often best regarded as an indication that the purported parents are conspecific.
Now back to the fun stuff. Here's a lovely little plant which appeared in my lawn this week. It looks like a super Scilla bifolia, but I suspect that it's had some help from erstwhile Chionodoxa sardensis. What do the rest of you think?
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I suppose the problem has always been that assuming 2 things that look similar are similar. Maybe this is why the 'New World' and the Southern hemisphere are full of wrens and blackbirds. I.e. find a species of bird no-one from Europe has seen before:- Is it small? Ah must be a wren. Is it black? Ah must be a blackbird. I guess that's how we end up with Scilla species on several continents ;- Is it blue (ish)- Must be Scilla and maybe helps explain a pan-global Viola genus.
If more DNA research continues to find Amaryllidaceae really has evolved from Alliaceae we will have to accept that we cannot judge by looks alone.
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Simon, some of us take it a step further and say that the ability of nominal species to "hybridize" is proof that the entities in question actually make up one morphologically variable species.
Jim,
That would make big chunks of orchidaceae into one species. A surprising number of orchids are able to interbreed.
Göte
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Simon, some of us take it a step further and say that the ability of nominal species to "hybridize" is proof that the entities in question actually make up one morphologically variable species.
Jim,
That would make big chunks of orchidaceae into one species. A surprising number of orchids are able to interbreed.
Göte
Yes, Göte, that's precisely the point I made on another forum in the past when the topic of the byzantine tangle of intergeneric hybrids of orchids arose: that some of us would cite the ability of these plants to produce viable, sexually reproducing progeny as evidence that the parental "genera" are in fact one morphologically variable species.
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Simon, some of us take it a step further and say that the ability of nominal species to "hybridize" is proof that the entities in question actually make up one morphologically variable species.
Traditional taxonomy was based on morphology. The traditional view was, more or less, if two things looked alike, they were members of the same species.
But that point of view got it backwards: if two organisms look alike, the likely explanation is that they share the same gene pool. In other words, they are not members of the same species because they look alike, it's rather that they look alike because they are members of the same species and share the same gene pool.
Jim - chicken & egg. In the case of animals, two organisms share, or contribute to, the same gene pool either because they 'look alike' (to each other) or are in some way mutually recognizable. In the case of plants, they are 'mutually recognizable' in the sense of being morphologically or physiologically compatible. The so-called 'Biological' concept of species has as many problems as the older morphological concept.
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Simon, some of us take it a step further and say that the ability of nominal species to "hybridize" is proof that the entities in question actually make up one morphologically variable species.
Traditional taxonomy was based on morphology. The traditional view was, more or less, if two things looked alike, they were members of the same species.
But that point of view got it backwards: if two organisms look alike, the likely explanation is that they share the same gene pool. In other words, they are not members of the same species because they look alike, it's rather that they look alike because they are members of the same species and share the same gene pool.
Jim - chicken & egg. In the case of animals, two organisms share, or contribute to, the same gene pool either because they 'look alike' (to each other) or are in some way mutually recognizable. In the case of plants, they are 'mutually recognizable' in the sense of being morphologically or physiologically compatible. The so-called 'Biological' concept of species has as many problems as the older morphological concept.
Gerry, when you say "The so-called 'Biological' concept of species has as many problems as the older morphological concept" , isn't it true that the "problems" are largely of a utilitarian nature? What I mean is that people in general expect species concept to be useful in some way, not simply a reflection of what is happening in nature.
And as for "chicken & egg": you must not be a zoölogist. Zoölogy answered this one long ago. The egg definitely came first. Chickens lay what is known as a cleidoic egg. The cleidoic egg evolved in the reptilian ancestors of chickens - it was around long before there were chickens. :) ;) :D ;D :o
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Gerry, when you say "The so-called 'Biological' concept of species has as many problems as the older morphological concept" , isn't it true that the "problems" are largely of a utilitarian nature? What I mean is that people in general expect species concept to be useful in some way, not simply a reflection of what is happening in nature.
And as for "chicken & egg": you must not be a zoölogist. Zoölogy answered this one long ago. The egg definitely came first. Chickens lay what is known as a cleidoic egg. The cleidoic egg evolved in the reptilian ancestors of chickens - it was around long before there were chickens. :) ;) :D ;D :o
Jim - Yes, there are problems in use by 'people in general' but I was referring to the scientific /philosophical problems pertaining to what species really are in nature. Not really a topic for a short post. I can PM you some references if you are interested but you will need access to a library which has a good range of journals, preferably a university library.
Well, my first degree was in zoology (of which I remember virtually nothing - it was a a very long time ago) but I was speaking metaphorically. The 'gene pool' is a dynamic entity which needs to be maintained & reproduced.
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Just because. Do you ever wonder what would happen one day if a Cattleya orchid (asa humanologist)was ever asked to try and attribute a species name to humans? Would it collect a fair selection of representative forms of human? Would it put all of these in one species, even though they may have red, brown, black or blond hair- how would it differentiate between differences in skin colour or height, body frame and weight? Would it maybe take a step back and check to see if humans were able to 'hybridise', and then wonder why the offspring generally didn't look much like their parents? The answer I guess is in the DNA somewhere.
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The answer I guess is in the DNA somewhere.
Many, many years ago on the BBC Radio 4 programme 'Any Questions' a regular participant was a farmer named A.G. Street. No matter what the question, his response was always - "The answer lies in the soil". He became famous.
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The answer I guess is in the DNA somewhere.
Maybe, but maybe not.
Each generation of scientists has seized on new advances in technology and applied these to the question of species. These new technologies typically provide insight, usually the sort of insight which allows us to say "A and B are not the same species". But no technology that I'm aware of allows us to say, purely on the basis of morphology, that A and B are the same species. Conspecificity is a function, a relationship, not a structure. It is tempting to infer function from morphology, but it's very difficult if not impossible to prove it purely from morphology.
I'm willing to bet that when the dust settles, current DNA studies will prove to be another example of this. DNA studies after all are a much more finely granular morphology - really a sort of meta-morphology. Is there really any reason to think that DNA studies, to the extent that they are ultra-refined morphological studies, will provide the answer to what is essentially not a question of morphology?
My apologies to all who have read this far and are wondering what any of this has to do with Scilla.
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The answer I guess is in the DNA somewhere.
Maybe, but maybe not.
Each generation of scientists has seized on new advances in technology and applied these to the question of species. These new technologies typically provide insight, usually the sort of insight which allows us to say "A and B are not the same species". But no technology that I'm aware of allows us to say, purely on the basis of morphology, that A and B are the same species. Conspecificity is a function, a relationship, not a structure. It is tempting to infer function from morphology, but it's very difficult if not impossible to prove it purely from morphology.
I'm willing to bet that when the dust settles, current DNA studies will prove to be another example of this. DNA studies after all are a much more finely granular morphology - really a sort of meta-morphology. Is there really any reason to think that DNA studies, to the extent that they are ultra-refined morphological studies, will provide the answer to what is essentially not a question of morphology?
My apologies to all who have read this far and are wondering what any of this has to do with Scilla.
Jim - I wonder whether you are between Scylla & Charybdis? Yes, I agree that DNA analysis is a technologically advanced version of traditional morphological analysis. Its limitations remain to be seen, though classical genetics suggests there will be some problems about relating it to gross morphology.
I don't really understand what you mean by "conspecificity is a function", unless you are referring to the 'biological' concept & the central importance there of the ability of two individuals to interbreed. The traditional, morphological concept of species - where a species is a class - is empirically untenable but there is nothing incoherent or logically flawed about it. To speak of two individuals being morphologically similar is to speak of a relationship. Similarity is a relationship & classes are constructed on the basis of similarity or sameness in particular respects.
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The answer I guess is in the DNA somewhere.
Maybe, but maybe not.
Each generation of scientists has seized on new advances in technology and applied these to the question of species. These new technologies typically provide insight, usually the sort of insight which allows us to say "A and B are not the same species". But no technology that I'm aware of allows us to say, purely on the basis of morphology, that A and B are the same species. Conspecificity is a function, a relationship, not a structure. It is tempting to infer function from morphology, but it's very difficult if not impossible to prove it purely from morphology.
I'm willing to bet that when the dust settles, current DNA studies will prove to be another example of this. DNA studies after all are a much more finely granular morphology - really a sort of meta-morphology. Is there really any reason to think that DNA studies, to the extent that they are ultra-refined morphological studies, will provide the answer to what is essentially not a question of morphology?
My apologies to all who have read this far and are wondering what any of this has to do with Scilla.
Jim - I wonder whether you are between Scylla & Charybdis? Yes, I agree that DNA analysis is a technologically advanced version of traditional morphological analysis. Its limitations remain to be seen, though classical genetics suggests there will be some problems about relating it to gross morphology.
I don't really understand what you mean by "conspecificity is a function", unless you are referring to the 'biological' concept & the central importance there of the ability of two individuals to interbreed. The traditional, morphological concept of species - where a species is a class - is empirically untenable but there is nothing incoherent or logically flawed about it. To speak of two individuals being morphologically similar is to speak of a relationship. Similarity is a relationship & classes are constructed on the basis of similarity or sameness in particular respects.
Yes, I had the biological concept in mind when I wrote that, and it was not my intent to use the terms function, similarity and relationship in the way they are used in formal logical argumentation.
Since we both agree that the the morphological concept of species is empirically untenable, I see no purpose in this argument in celebrating the logical validity of its structure or application. But please don't misunderstand me: in other contexts an understanding of those things can be important, if only because they help us understand the work of those who have worked from the viewpoint of the traditional morphological concept of species.
I think there is an interesting parallel between the discussion we are conducting and one concerning a knowledge of classical Latin and Greek in taxonomy. Such knowledge seems to becoming rarer and rarer among practicing horticulturists and botanists. It seems to me that even among those who regard such knowledge as irrelevant and deservedly obsolescent, some level of knowledge is necessary, if only because it will allow us to understand why things were done the way they were in the old days.
I'm all for preserving an understanding of why people in the past did things the way they did.
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Since we both agree that the the morphological concept of species is empirically untenable, I see no purpose in this argument in celebrating the logical validity of its structure or application. But please don't misunderstand me: in other contexts an understanding of those things can be important, if only because they help us understand the work of those who have worked from the viewpoint of the traditional morphological concept of species.
Jim - I promise this is my last post on the subject. Lovers of Scilla must be fed up.
I claimed that the traditional morphological concept of species - based on gross morphology - is empirically untenable. This does not rule out a non-traditional morphological concept. A few biologists are attempting to develop such a concept based on developmental mechanisms. It remains to be seen whether this is possible. Since the 'biological' concept has a multitude of problems all it's own, some alternative concept is required if we are to retain a notion of species as real entities.
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Since the 'biological' concept has a multitude of problems all it's own, some alternative concept is required if we are to retain a notion of species as real entities.
It's another example of the old philosophical conundrum: as a concept approaches certainty, it loses meaning in the real world.
I'll bow out on that, and in doing so I hope to dodge both Scylla and Charybdis, although I wonder if either Scylla or Charybdis has an indigenous species of Scilla of the Oncostema sort.
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Nothing is straightforward, Ramonda x Jancaea and the Ramoda x Haberlea hybrids both differ in chromosome numbers, hardly evidence of conspecificity.
What about convergent and divergent evolution, the former when two clearly distinct species evolve to become look alikes?
I always understood that to be a species there must be some barrier to breeding. Not even that is straightforward when even separation by large distances and long evolutionary time does not separate species that are clearly different.
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Yes, but clearly different us may not mean much to the plants in question- though it may mean an awful lot to their pollinators.
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We have been discussing this before.
I have noted from political discussions that the definition of the word "democratic" is "something the speaker likes" and the definition of "undemocratic" is "something that the speaker does not like" ;D
We run into this here. "Species is what the speaker calls it." Now if we discuss whether something is a Scilla or not we are not discussing the species but the genus.
It is extremely impractical to start changing the name every time a new DNA-fragment is found somewhere. We are running in a situation where names become useless. I cannot go out in the garden and disregard morphological questions.
If one says: that the traditional morphological concept of species - based on gross morphology - is empirically untenable. This means that this person and those who think as he define the concept of species in a way that makes morphological concept of species empirically untenable. This, of course makes me wonder what is meant by empirical. Taxonomy is older than DNA-sequencing by a few hundred years.
When Jim says that Orchidaceae is one big species is just tells us what HE means with the word species. It tells us nothing about the plants in question.
A name is a name is a name. If I find a plant that confirms to say Anemone hepatica L. as described in the original diagnosis it is an Anemone hepatica L. even if the DNA says it is a magpie.
This is a traditional way of defining species and it serves us well. It does not tell us the latest news about ancestry but it puts stable labels on plants that are useful to us.
Göte
If it walks like a duck and sounds like a duck and looks like a duck it is a Citroën 2CV ;D
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If one says: that the traditional morphological concept of species - based on gross morphology - is empirically untenable. This means that this person and those who think as he define the concept of species in a way that makes morphological concept of species empirically untenable. This, of course makes me wonder what is meant by empirical. Taxonomy is older than DNA-sequencing by a few hundred years.
Göte - The traditional - Linnaean - morphological concept of species conceives species as (logical) classes. Classes are defined in terms of common or shared properties &, by definition, classes cannot have unusual members. The variation which exists in organisms has always posed problems for this traditional view; one way of dealing with this has been to multiply classes, i.e., invent subspecies, varieties etc, a procedure which, in principle, could continue until there are as many classes as there are individual organisms. Another way is to accept that the Linnaean concept is empirically untenable & attempt to elaborate an alternative based the so-called 'biological' concept of species derived from evolution theory. The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality. I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions. There is a good deal of serious academic research on the topic &, if you wish, I can send you references.
This whole question is quite distinct from taxonomic revisions based on DNA analysis, concerning which, & as yet, I am somewhat sceptical.
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The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality.
I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions.
All members of a class do not need to be identical. However, we can define criteria that circumscribe a class. We can also define subclasses by defining criteria that that circumscribe these. That far I am with you but then we are of diverging opinions. I cannot see that you have shown that the Linnean system is untenable. You probably have underlying assumptions which you assume I accept a priori so you do not need to mention them. I probably do not accept them.
My view is that we humans define the criteria used in classification. These definitions cannot be described as true or false. They are what they are. Let me make an example that is somewhat obsolete but easy to discuss:
We can say that plants with six anthers belong to the class Hexandria L. (In fact someone did) I cannot see that this poses a problem in the classification. Practically all angiosperms have a number of anthers and that number is six or it is something else. Your statement that it is a question of truth and reality does not apply. If plants having six stamens are classified as hexandria this IS the truth since this is the definition of Hexandria. It is also the reality since they DO have six anthers.
The problem comes if we say that classification at all cost must reflect the biological history. This is a criterion that is in conflict with the previous. This is where our problems lie. There are disadvantages with this criterion:
#1: Taken all the way, it makes previous taxonomy obsolete; meaning what we have learnt and what we have on our labels and in our books becomes significantly more uncertain.
#2: We do not know. Whatever the brave new researchers may say, we do not know. We guess based on various research results which are too esoteric for those who do not have a big laboratory at command and the guesses change all the time.
#3: It makes it utterly difficult to find the name of a found plant and to classify a new.
#4 Differentiation does not occur burstwise. The genealogical tree does not suddenly split into many branches. New branches bud off singly. Sometimes they also merge. Unless we accept monotypical classes all over, we will have to accept some kind of arbitrary (meaning manmade) borderlines that circumscribe classes be it genus, species, order or family.
It all boils down to what a name is used for. Is it a history record, like the names of the ents in 'The Ring' or is it a label that we use in order to get a handle on a phenomenon called a plant. To me it is a handle like the handles we use in computer programming or the number in a street address. Utilty is indeed important. It would seem to me that if we abandon utility as criterion we by definition create a useless system.
It is of interest to know that Highstreet No 11 is built 1998 and highstreet No 13 is built 1956 but for that reason we do not switch their numbers. We find it practical to number buildings in sequence as they stand not according to age. Once upon a time houses indeed were numbered after age. This is the reason why Eau de Cologne has 'Glockengasse 4711' in the name. Once upon a time (perhaps not in the UK) Maria, daughter of Karl Andersson would be named Maria Karlsdotter. Today we call her Maria Andersson although her father's name is not Anders and she is not his son.
I do not advocate that we should completely disregard what we believe about relationships when classifying. What I advocate is that we should stick to easily observed traits when we define the criteria that we use in classification and to use criteria that give a useful system. If we abandon the original diagnosis and the type specimen as basis for a name, nearly all names need to be redefined.
Göte
You are right. I have a technical background. That is precisely why I cannot see the problems in a mathematical approach to classification.
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The matter has nothing to do with personal preferences or, indeed, utility but with truth & reality.
I have the impression that your own background is in the physical sciences so I would expect you to appreciate these distinctions.
All members of a class do not need to be identical. However, we can define criteria that circumscribe a class. We can also define subclasses by defining criteria that that circumscribe these. That far I am with you but then we are of diverging opinions. I cannot see that you have shown that the Linnean system is untenable. You probably have underlying assumptions which you assume I accept a priori so you do not need to mention them. I probably do not accept them.
My view is that we humans define the criteria used in classification. These definitions cannot be described as true or false. They are what they are. Let me make an example that is somewhat obsolete but easy to discuss:
Göte
You are right. I have a technical background. That is precisely why I cannot see the problems in a mathematical approach to classification.
All members of a class must be identical with respect to the properties in terms of which the class is defined, the so-called ‘essential’ properties. Other properties with respect to which the members are not identical are irrelevant. This is where the problem of taxonomic ‘essentialism’ arises in relation to variation i.e., trying to determine what are the 'essential' properties which can be used to define a species.
I agree that definitions are neither true nor false. The question is whether anything in nature answers to the definition
I have already pointed out that there is a substantial body of relatively recent academic work on this whole question of species concepts. May I suggest you read some of it - you might find it illuminating? The Linnaean, morphological concept of species has been called into question on both empirical & theoretical grounds by many evolutionary biologists of whom Ernst Mayr is probably the most notable (if not the most rigorous). However, the untenability of the Linnaean concept of species was finally demonstrated not by me but by the American philosopher of biology David Hull using the biologist's arguments combined with an analysis of the logical structure of the Linnaean system. Although you may find his conclusions inconvenient, his argument is compelling.
I neither propose nor support the view that classifications must reflect biological history (genealogy or phylogeny) though they may do so incidentally. Even the Linnaean system is thought to do so by some evolutionary biologists; as the late Helen Spurway put it - to claim that two species belong to the same genus is to claim that they have a common ancestor.
Your position on science seems to have more than a touch of relativism about it in addition to the obvious utilitarianism. In matters pertaining to the philosophy of science I am a realist & consequently believe that science (even biology) is not concerned with utility but with the real structure of nature & with truth. If anything useful emerges, that is a bonus. The development of science frequently renders previous beliefs obsolete. If this detracts from their usefulness & proves inconvenient, too bad.
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Gerry,
A naming system is basically utilitarian. We use it as a tool. A name is shorthand for an enumeration of all the properties we think are relevant in order to circumscribe the "subject" of a name.
You question whether something answers to the definition is to me unclear. I do not understand.
If I define the class Hexandria as plants having six anthers I define it thus because I have observed plants having six anthers and I find the numbers of anthers a property that is easy to observe and useful for classification. You do not question my statement that there are plants having six anthers do you?
Since all diagnoses are verbal descriptions of the type specimen, there must have been something that answered to the definition; at least one and at least at the time. Your question is perhaps whether the diagnosis fits other specimen. I think that it is very clear that it does. It has done that for a quarter millennium. Plants have been assigned names and it is being done innumerable times every hour. Every time we look up a plant in a book, catalogue or botanic garden we make utilitarian use of the classification. The name tells us a number of properties; many if we are knowledgable, few if we are not. It DOES work Gerry.
Human fallibility being what it is, many diagnoses have been imperfect and we have been forced to change. That is not an argument because this happens in all systems. .
I cannot help remembering the bumble bee. It cannot fly but it does not know so it flies anyway. If something works it is tenable. If someone claims that for philosophical reasons that it is not, that person is in error or the philosophy is in error. In my days in the Swedish army I read in the instructions. "If the terrain and the map disagree: The terrain is right". I think that this is an important principle.
"to claim that two species belong to the same genus is to claim that they have a common ancestor." This statement is incomplete and thereby nearly devoid of meaning. We believe ALL plants have a common ancestor.
"The development of science frequently renders previous beliefs obsolete." It all depends upon what we believe. If we believe in some kind of hidden "Inner truth" that can be found lurking in the names it may be possible to falsify the name (or rather the lurking "truth") but if we do not do that but stick to the diagnosis it cannot be falsified. Should science some time in the future show that plants with six anthers never existed I will accept 'Hexandria' as meaningless but until then......
You write: "Your position on science seems to have more than a touch of relativism about it in addition to the obvious utilitarianism. In matters pertaining to the philosophy of science I am a realist & consequently believe that science (even biology) is not concerned with utility but with the real structure of nature & with truth."
I think that you do misread me. Let me start at the end: Science has to do with truth - tools have not. A naming system is a tool. A microscope can be good and it can be bad but it cannot be true or false. In principle only statements can be falsified. (Not all sentences that look like statements are statements). If I say: "This is Lilium concolor" I in reality say: "This is a plant that fulfils the criteria in the valid diagnosis of Lilium concolor". My statement can be falsified. If the plant has blue flowers the statement is untrue. The diagnosis of L concolor cannot be falsified. It is not a statement. It is a kind of creation. It can be badly constructed but it cannot be false.
No name is a part of "The real structure of nature". We cannot find the "True Name" of anything - even if we were to define a plant by a complete chart of its genome It would still be a human creation - guided by the finds but not created by them.
Tools need to be utilitarian otherwise it will be more difficult to find the truths. If we cannot name phenomena with a stable and understandable system we are nearly unable to find any truths whatsoever.
I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.
Göte
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Postscript.
I cannot help finding this in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"most academic philosophers in the English-speaking world see the label ‘relativist’ as the kiss of death" :'(
Please let me assure anyone who would be worried that like Mr Clemens I can claim:
"The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated" ;D
Göte
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I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.
Göte
Göte -
I suggest the following:
Rom Harre, (1970). The Principles of Scientific Thinking, University of Chicago Press.
A good deal has been written about the 'species problem' since Linnaeus. The following provide useful introductions to the modern discussions to which I referred:
D.L. Hull, (1965). The effect of essentialism on taxonomy - two thousand years of stasis. Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 15, 314-326; 16, 1-18.
D.L. Hull, (1976). A matter of individuality. Philosophy of Science 45, 335-360.
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I'm really enjoying this discussion (from the safety of the sidelines) and I don't mean that to be in any way sarcastic; it's a fascinating mind-workout trying to follow it. You're never going to agree of course, and it sometimes looks a bit like two very different discussions, not that that matters in the slightest.
From a purely practical viewpoint, I'm just glad we have a system that allows us to name plants in a (fairly) universally agreed way and thereby talk about them in a sensible way, on this forum and elsewhere. The search for better systems should be applauded but we have to work with what we have here and now, otherwise we'd all still be living in caves poo-pooing the design for the wheel while waiting for Ugg to come up with an anti-gravity engine.
Now you can both feel free to whack away at me and my ignorant impertinence instead of each other for a while. ;D
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Martin - I'm glad the exchange provided enjoyment. I'm sorry that my last post on the matter was my last post on the matter.
I agree that the Linnaean system in its present form works reasonably well a lot of the time, but one only has to look at the Sternbergia thread to see where it doesn't. And as for narcissus of the bulbocodium persuasion..........The debates between 'Splitters' & 'Lumpers' are the manifestations in the practical domain of the theoretical (or philosophical) problem - 'what is a species'?.
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one only has to look at the Sternbergia thread to see where it doesn't. And as for narcissus of the bulbocodium persuasion..........The debates between 'Splitters' & 'Lumpers' are the manifestations in the practical domain of the theoretical (or philosophical) problem - 'what is a species'?.
...and in crocus and some galanthus...
I do appreciate what a difficult - and fascinating - question that is ('what is a species?'). It seems easy to answer when looking at very widely divergent species, especially in the animal world, less so when looking at very close 'species' in the plant world.
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I to have really enjoyed this thread from the sidelines. I am quite incapable of joining in but it has been stimulating and thought provoking.
I await the next one with great anticipation on what ever subject.
Thank you both.
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I too have enjoyed the recent discussions very much. Being involved with the study of species hellebores for the last eight years, I can appreciate the frustrations of taxonomists. Fifteen trips to the Balkans over this time have raised more questions than answers.
Göte, I have found your views refreshing; I am no longer involved with hellebores (for various reasons, some related to do with having a seven month old little boy and therefore no spare time, and others directly related to taxonomy and what one German 'expert' wants to so with it all if he gets his own way; I no longer have the time or the energy to fight the cause), but many of your opinions almost ignite the fire within me again.
No offence to you, Gerry; I have enjoyed the discussion from both points of view.
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I am not quite sure what you mean by "more than a touch of relativism" Since you oppose it to your realistic view concerned with Truth I suppose it is not praise. I would have believed that my approach is the one used in mathematics and I think that you are completely mistaken but I would be very pleased if you could elaborate a little on your statement.
Göte
Göte -
I suggest the following:
Rom Harre, (1970). The Principles of Scientific Thinking, University of Chicago Press.
A good deal has been written about the 'species problem' since Linnaeus. The following provide useful introductions to the modern discussions to which I referred:
D.L. Hull, (1965). The effect of essentialism on taxonomy - two thousand years of stasis. Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 15, 314-326; 16, 1-18.
D.L. Hull, (1976). A matter of individuality. Philosophy of Science 45, 335-360.
Excuse me but I still want to know why you call me a relativist. I am quite sure that my name does not occur in these books. I am even more sure that you have not in these books written about me.
Come on! Defend your statement!
By the way: Does the Harre book say anything about argument "ad hominem" If so please read it again!
Göte
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Dear Gerry,
I regret the flippant tone of my last post. My excuse is that I am not more pleased to be called names than people usually are. Your placing me and the beliefs you believe I hold, against yourself where you call yourself a realist seeking the truth seems to put me on the side of the lie and the unrealistic. I pointed that out in a roundabout way in order to give you an opportunity to reformulate yourself in a less offending way but you did not do that.
Vikipedia defines utalitarian as : “Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility” I am at a loss to how you can determine my attitude to moral questions from my attitude to naming of plants. Instead of saying that I am offended, I am asking you for an explanation. Your answer was that I should read books about philosophy. This is not very helpful since I am asking about your perception of me which is unlikely to be found in a book.
You also say that I am a relativist. This is in itself not pejorative since some kinds of relativism are inevitable. It is difficult to say that something is big unless we mean that it is big relatively to something. On the other hand you say that you are a realist and seeking the truth. I must thus conclude that you mean that I am a relativist as regards truths. That is no doubt a pejorative verdict. However I am not complaining about insults, I am merely asking you to clarify. Again I cannot find that clarification in any book.
I mirrored your own way of answering by asking you to read. That was wrong by me. My excuse is that I was somewhat irritated by being treated like a schoolboy. I should have said clearly what I mean and that was: “You are using ad hominem argumentation. My stance, relative to relativism and utilitarianism, have nothing to do with whether my views on the use of botanical names are right or wrong.“
Yours
Göte
PS let us hope that I am not invoking Godwin’s law.
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Dear Gerry,
I regret the flippant tone of my last post. My excuse is that I am not more pleased to be called names than people usually are. Your placing me and the beliefs you believe I hold, against yourself where you call yourself a realist seeking the truth seems to put me on the side of the lie and the unrealistic. I pointed that out in a roundabout way in order to give you an opportunity to reformulate yourself in a less offending way but you did not do that.
Vikipedia defines utalitarian as : “Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility” I am at a loss to how you can determine my attitude to moral questions from my attitude to naming of plants. Instead of saying that I am offended, I am asking you for an explanation. Your answer was that I should read books about philosophy. This is not very helpful since I am asking about your perception of me which is unlikely to be found in a book.
You also say that I am a relativist. This is in itself not pejorative since some kinds of relativism are inevitable. It is difficult to say that something is big unless we mean that it is big relatively to something. On the other hand you say that you are a realist and seeking the truth. I must thus conclude that you mean that I am a relativist as regards truths. That is no doubt a pejorative verdict. However I am not complaining about insults, I am merely asking you to clarify. Again I cannot find that clarification in any book.
I mirrored your own way of answering by asking you to read. That was wrong by me. My excuse is that I was somewhat irritated by being treated like a schoolboy. I should have said clearly what I mean and that was: “You are using ad hominem argumentation. My stance, relative to relativism and utilitarianism, have nothing to do with whether my views on the use of botanical names are right or wrong.“
Yours
Göte
PS let us hope that I am not invoking Godwin’s law.
Dear Göte,
Although I had vowed to discontinue this exchange, I suppose I am honour bound to respond to your last post.
1. Relativism - my comment here was based on your previous remarks (see post 16) which seem to suggest that you regard scientific beliefs as matters of personal preference. This is relativism.
2. Utilitarianism - my apologies here, I was using the term in the everyday rather than the technical sense. The correct technical term is instrumentalism. This is a philosophy of science which claims that scientific beliefs are merely “tools” - a term you have used frequently - and are not to be understood as making claims about reality. By contrast realist philosophies of science construe scientific beliefs as claims about reality (which may be true or false). As far as I am concerned, this is not a discussion about names (‘tools’) but about the nature of species (reality). From a realist perspective, to give two entities ( say, species) different names is not simply a matter of convenience but embodies the claim that they are really different. To investigate this claim involves attempting to determine what species really are.
3. I have pointed out that the vews I was advancing are not original with me but were developed by the American philosopher of biology David Hull & based on previous arguments by the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr. It is these views which you seem to regard as mistaken, hence I thought it might be useful if you read some of Hull’s work. In fact, I regard Hull’s critique of the Linnaean system as truly brilliant & while I have my own criticisms of his later views, these are not pertinent to the present discussion
4. I’m sorry you regard my arguments as ad hominem and insulting; they were not so intended. Rather, I was merely attempting to characterise your arguments in terms of well-known philosophical positions. I have no "perceptions" of you (apart from the fact that you seem to be very quick to take offence) & my comments were entirely directed at the arguments you were advancing. Of course I was not saying or even implying that you were "on the side of the lie". Realism is a stance in the philosophy of science; it does not imply any moral evaluations.
5. This really is my final post on the matter. As Martin remarked, we are extremely unlikely to agree so I think that little would be gained by further exchanges.
Gerry
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I'm up late writing and I'm tired, so I probably shouldn't jump into this tar pit, but I've been thinking about it on and off all day and it does seem to be me, as I mentioned earlier, that there are two quite different discussions going on here. It seems like one of you is talking about the questions of scientific philosophy raised by attempts to accurately classify the natural world and the other is talking about the practical implications for botanists and gardeners of a classification system that is in flux.
The points of reference are therefore very different and the use of language and interpretation of language equally different, so it was inevitable that you'd end up where you are, disagreeing strongly and with offence taken where perhaps none may have been intended.
Not that I neccessarily want you to stop! ;D I'm learning all the time. For example, I now know what an ad hominem argument is and I've discovered that Godwin's Law is a particularly interesting concept, if not an entirely serious one. Thanks again for a fascinating discourse. I'm sorry it's got so heated, but it has been very interesting nonetheless.
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Martin - You are probably right, & this provides a good reason to stop what has become an unproductive exchange. This is not the appropriate place to conduct such a discussion & it was a mistake for me to get involved in the first place. I only did so because Jim McKenney, who started the thread, seemed interested in the scientific issues.
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Dear Gerry,
Thank you for clarifying , I am grateful for your explanation which clarifies your meaning and I think that it is a pity that you stop a discussion that could lead somewhere. It is, as Martin writes, useful to be forced to think things over. We usually have a many beliefs and some knowledge that we have not made clear - even to ourselves - and you have forced some of these (mine) to the surface.
I have a slight handicap that I share with many. I write English fairly gramatically correct and fairly well spelt (Thank you Mr Gates) This does not mean that we always write exactly what we think we do. The English reader, however, is unaware of this. It is of course the other way round too. If you say that you did not intend AH argument I gratefully accept that and all is well on my side.
It would be very far from me to believe that scientific truth is depending upon personal beliefs. (Strangely enough quantum physics seem to be based on the belief that properties that we have not yet measured do not exist a belief that seems to make truths depend upon the individual. I agree with Einstein - not with Bohr) I have used the word tool in the everyday meaning. A name is a handle to something and a handle is a tool. One could argue that a hypothesis sometimes could be used as a tool but this is not my meaning here. I see naming systems as tools and the tool in itself is unable to be true or false. A tool is also not a scientific belief. The application of the name can of course be wrong or right.
I do not know what beliefs Carl von Linné held in 1753. At least officially he held the belief that species were classes created by the Lord and they were permanent and constant. The idea that all members of a genus would have a common ancestor would be heresy in the theological meaning of the word. What he wanted to create was order in chaos and I think he did that. The idea that species are permanent, always separate entities is not tenable and I give you right in that. Already Darwin and to some extent Mendel defeated that idea. The tool - the naming system - is, however, in my view tenable. In a majority of cases it works well for all who use it. The tool depends upon the users. The users have to assign borders between entities that should be given one name and those that should be given another. These borders are man-made just as the names themselves are man-made. If the borders reflect an underlying difference so much the better. However there are underlying differences all the way down to the individual specimen and the choice will be man-made. Einstein once said. "God does not play dice" I would add, 'He does not give names either' (Adam did that ;) )
I would like to paraphrase Professor Parkinson and say that a perfect system is a dead system. Sometimes we get a mess. This mess is unavoidable. We all make mistakes. Sometimes because of stupidity, sometimes because of irrational bias, In the case of naming, the main reason is lack of information. This lack of information is typical for the naming of a new plant. If it does not even have a name we do not know much else either. No naming system can avoid this problem. Thus when Gawler named a, for him, new Lily L. tigrinum he was unaware that Thunberg had named it L. lancifolium in the previous century. When Franchet named one lily L. lankongense and another L. duchatreii he was unaware that intermediate forms exist. Gawler's mistake is rectified by the very obvious rule that the oldest name is the right one. Franchet's mistake is trickier. The present idea seems to be that L. lankongense is but a geographical variation of L. duchatreii. My point is that I can still use the name L. lankongense Franch if the plant in question fits Franchets original description.
Fortunately for the taxonomist, the majority of plants do not overlap. However some do and quite often I find myself on the side of the lumpers. I do not believe that all Trilliums are different entities to give one example. On the other hand I do not believe that it is correct to call Kinugasa japonica Paris japonica. It is much too different.
If we assume that naming systems must closely reflect the "true" relationships we run into trouble. It is not so that a proto-Lilium suddenly splits into a number of different species. The changes go one step at a time. L hansonii seems closer to L martagon than to L lancifolium but is L. medeloides closer to L. hansonii than to L. martagon? We can find out but we end up with the situation that we have to put a border somewhere. This border can never be a "natural" border. When the system works well there are no overlaps because the intermediate plants are extinct.
Fortunately I am not in the botanical "business" thus I can do as I please. Since I, by stooping down and looking the flower in the face, immediately can see the difference between a Chionodoxa and a Scilla I will go on calling it Chionodoxa thereby conforming with the virtual flora published by the Swedish Museum of Natural Nistory and practically all litterature, catalogues and labels in botanical gardens. If I call it Scilla, I only cause confusion.
With the best regards
Göte.
PS
Names are like other words. They are defined in dictioneries by people using other words as tools of definition. Sometimes there are synonyms, sometimes there are homonyms. In spite of the difficulties we do not change to Esperanto or Assembler.
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